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Abstract
Introduction: There are significant financial barriers to access treatment for multi drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-
TB) in India. To address these challenges, Chhattisgarh state in India has established a MDR-TB financial protection
policy by creating MDR-TB benefit packages as part of the universal health insurance scheme that the state has
rolled out in their effort towards attaining Universal Health Coverage for all its residents. In these schemes the state
purchases health insurance against set packages of services from third party health insurance agencies on behalf of
all its residents. Provider payment reform by strategic purchasing through output based payments (lump sum fee is
reimbursed as per the MDR-TB benefit package rates) to the providers – both public and private health facilities
empanelled under the insurance scheme was the key intervention.
Aim: To understand the implementation gap between policy and practice of the benefit packages with respect to
equity in utilization of package claims by the poor patients in public and private sector.
Methods: Data from primary health insurance claims from January 2013 to December 2015, were analysed using
an extension of ‘Kingdon’s multiple streams for policy implementation framework’ to explain the implementation
gap between policy and practice of the MDR-TB benefit packages.
Results: The total number of claims for MDR-TB benefit packages increased over the study period mainly from
poor patients treated in public facilities, particularly for the pre-treatment evaluation and hospital stay packages.
Variations and inequities in utilizing the packages were observed between poor and non-poor beneficiaries in
public and private sector. Private providers participation in the new MDR-TB financial protection mechanism
through the universal health insurance scheme was observed to be much lower than might be expected given
their share of healthcare provision overall in India.
Conclusion: Our findings suggest that there may be an implementation gap due to weak coupling between the
problem and the policy streams, reflecting weak coordination between state nodal agency and the state TB
department. There is a pressing need to build strong institutional capacity of the public and private sector for
improving service delivery to MDR-TB patients through this new health insurance mechanism.
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Introduction
Public subsidies that target the poor and vulnerable are
widely used in developing countries to increase their ac-
cess to health care. Targeted subsidies can be provided
through health insurance premiums, health equity funds,
vouchers, conditional cash transfers; and are demand
side health financing mechanisms for achieving universal
health coverage (UHC) [1–3]. In many high and middle
income countries, insurance based models are the main
instruments used to ensure financial protection for the
entire population, achieved through financial reforms in
revenue collection, pooling and purchasing [4]. Such
health financing reforms improve equity in the distribu-
tion of resources, leading to improvements in equity in
utilization of services and financial protection [4] by en-
suring robust implementation of the insurance schemes,
acting as a vehicle for achieving universal health cover-
age (UHC).
In India, health system is pluralistic with asymmetric
healthcare distributive network across public and private
sector [5], with 66% of hospitals and 80% of ambulatory
care provided by the private sector [6]. The high user
fees charged by these private providers combined with
low health insurance penetration have led to high levels
of out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure. These high OOP
expenditures are particularly evident in the diagnosis
and treatment of chronic diseases, often resulting in
catastrophic health expenditure for poorer patients [5]
thereby jeopardising India’s progress towards UHC. One
such chronic disease disproportionately prevalent
amongst the poor is Tuberculosis (TB) [7]. Looking at fi-
nancial risk protection in relation to TB can therefore
highlight important general lessons to inform decisions
toward effective policy-making in the context of achiev-
ing UHC [8].
The World Health Organization recommends address-
ing poverty in national TB control programmes by pro-
moting equity and pro-poor policies in disease
prevention and control activities [9]. The high cost of
treatment and the need to take medication over a long
period of time, especially for multi-drug resistant TB
(MDR-TB) patients, makes treatment less accessible for
the poor [10]. Moreover, implementation gap previously
shown in the literature appeared to lead to increased risk
of incurring catastrophic expenditure due to TB [11]. In
India, 84,000 multidrug-resistant (MDR)-TB cases are
estimated to emerge annually among notified pulmonary
TB cases [12], while a similar volume of cases are ex-
pected to be managed by the private sector but remain
un-notified [13]. MDR-TB is forecasted to increase by
12% among incident TB cases in India, and additional
control efforts are urgently required, beyond diagnosis
and treatment of MDR-TB [14], to prevent increasing
risk of incurring catastrophic expenditure due to MDR-
TB. Disease burden due to TB in India is 3.27% (2.58% -
4.21%) of total DALY’s [15], which can be averted by ex-
pansion and robust implementation of tuberculosis ser-
vices that are cost-effective in high-burden countries
[16]. There is need to have greater emphasis on innova-
tive patient support mechanism, which among many in-
cludes prevention of catastrophic health expenditure due
to MDR-TB through health insurance mechanism [13].
Kingdon’s agenda-setting framework, suggests that
when conditions in three streams: Problem, Politics and
Policy, come together to bring an issue into the policy
agenda, a window of opportunity arises for policy change
[17]. The issue has to be seen to address a clearly de-
fined problem (in the problem stream) and then a policy
solution to the problem has to be available (in the policy
stream) [18]. The political environment has to be
favourable in addressing the problem (in the political
stream). Such coupling creates an open policy window
[17, 18]. In Chhattisgarh, a “tribal” state (as notified by
the Government of India) in central India, similar coup-
ling of Kingdon’s three streams for agenda setting had
taken place that had led to the emergence of a financial
risk protection policy for MDR-TB patients in the state.
This is described as follows:
Policy stream
In 2011, the Programmatic Management of Drug Resist-
ant (PMDT) programme was launched in the State of
Chhattisgarh as per the national PMDT policy expansion
vision. The state attained full coverage for treating the
MDR-TB ‘free of cost’ with centres established to iden-
tify Drug Resistant (DR) -TB in all the medical colleges
of the state as of December 2012. As per the national
PMDT policy, all MDR-TB patients have to undergo
pre-treatment evaluations. The drug resistant TB patient
should be hospitalized at the DR-TB Centre for a period
of seven days to undergo pre-treatment evaluation for
identifying those patients who are at a greater risk of ad-
verse effects and to establish a baseline for monitoring,
as the drugs for management of MDR-TB patients (2nd
line anti-tuberculosis drugs) are toxic in nature [19].
Drug Resistant-TB centre is ideally established in the
medical college hospital, a tertiary level health centre for
pre-treatment evaluation, treatment initiation and man-
agement of side effects. During the same year, 2012, TB
was made a notifiable disease by the Government of
India [20].
Problem stream
Drug-resistant TB is known to be fatal and is estimated
to be 100 times more costlier to treat [21] than cases of
drug-sensitive TB [22]. In the private sector, out of
pocket (OOP) health expenditure by a MDR-TB patient
due to user fees for staying in the hospital, laboratory
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investigations on account of pre-treatment and follow-
up evaluations are estimated to be eighty times, three
times and four times more expensive than in the public
sector respectively. This will often force poorer house-
holds to incur catastrophic health expenditure leading to
impoverishment if not protected by a financial protec-
tion mechanism [13]. User fees for laboratory investiga-
tions (both pre-treatment and follow-up investigations)
can be catastrophic for a poor MDR-TB patient even in
the public sector [13]. OOP health expenditure accruing
to any household member with TB that exceeds one-
fifth (20%) of household annual income is considered to
be catastrophic for that household [23].
Politics stream
The government of Chhattisgarh, envisages achieving
UHC by improving the affordability, availability and ac-
cessibility of quality health care to every resident of the
state [24]. To this end, the state had initiated universal
health insurance scheme (UHIS) after announcement of
this initiative from the Chief Minister, political head of
the government in the state, in 2012. The UHIS provides
health insurance coverage and protection to all people
to fund their medical treatment on voluntary and
hospitalization basis. It is managed by the National
Health Insurance Programme, known as the “Rashtriya
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)” Or social security
scheme for a family with a maximum 5 household (HH)
members who either live below the poverty line (BPL) or
are members of specific categories of unorganized
workers. These categories include - Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA) workers, Building and Other Construction
(BOC) workers, Beedi workers, Domestic workers,
Licensed Railway Porters, Street Vendors, Sanitation
Workers, Mine Workers, Rickshaw Pullers, Rag Pickers,
Auto and Taxi Drivers [25]. In addition to this Chhattis-
garh state also provides the “Mukhyamantri Swasthya
Bima Yojana (MSBY)” Or Chief Minister’s Health Insur-
ance Scheme for every HH in the state, if not covered by
RSBY. MSBY is also limited to a maximum 5 HH mem-
bers, and consists mainly of HH who are above the pov-
erty line (APL) [Fig. 1]. Chhattisgarh is the first state in
the country to initiate the UHIS which provides health
insurance coverage to all state residents to fund their
medical treatment.
Window of opportunity (coupling of problem and politics
stream) for emergence of MDR-TB financial protection
policy
Leveraging the opportunity for inter-sectoral collabor-
ation, the State Tuberculosis (TB) Control Programme
in Chhattisgarh facilitated partnership with RSBY and
MSBY for Multi Drug Resistant TB (MDR-TB) patients
in the year 2012 through creation of MDR-TB benefit
packages for absorbing user fees for all pre-treatment
evaluations, admissions, follow-up evaluations, ancillary
drugs and nutritional support across all RSBY and MSBY
empanelled network hospitals (both private and public)
in the state [13]. The MDR-TB benefit packages are
[Table 1]: 1) MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation, 2)
MDR-TB follow-up evaluation, and 3) MDR-TB hospital
stay; an innovative financial protection mechanism to
absorb OOP expenses incurred by MDR-TB patients
from diagnosis to treatment completion across the
public and private sector [13]. Overall objectives for
establishing the MDR-TB benefits packages as a financial
protection policy were to achieve equity in utilization of
Fig. 1 Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS) as managed by RSBY and MSBY (Developed from Cotlear et al., 2015)
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the packages in the sense that patients with equal needs
should receive the benefit of the packages irrespective of
their income (between poor and non-poor) [26].
Provider payment financial reform through fee for
service was established by the creation of three MDR-TB
benefit packages. Also, as per the insurance policy, the
pre-treatment and follow-up packages are to be co-used
with the hospital stay package, as utilization of the RSBY
and MSBY health insurance scheme package for
MDR-TB is based on hospitalization. The key financial
reform steps taken for the MDR-TB patients in
Chhattisgarh were:
1. Creation of RSBY and MSBY benefit packages [13]
targeting the MDR-TB patients and integrating these
packages with the list of other RSBY and MSBY dis-
ease packages in Chhattisgarh.
2. Piggy-backing on the already existing national health
insurance programme - RSBY.
3. Contracting of the third party insurance agency
(TPA) by the State Nodal Agency, to obtain pre-
defined health services for the MDR-TB patients.
Initial experience with such a collaboration between
Revised National TB Control Programme (RNTCP) and
the UHIS through creation of benefit packages for pa-
tients with MDR-TB shows that such partnership can be
set up and can in principle act to reduce OOP expend-
iture [13]. Previous studies have highlighted the mechan-
ism emphasizing collaboration between RNTCP and
health insurance schemes (RSBY and MSBY) for MDR-
TB patients [13]. Exclusionary process that operates at
all steps of implementation of the RSBY scheme due to
issues of awareness, enrolment, utilization, delay in re-
imbursements to providers and fraudulent practices have
been widely studied [27–31]. However, none of the exist-
ing studies have reported on the variation and inequities
in utilization for specific benefits packages within the in-
surance scheme. Therefore, the aim of this study is to
whether or not the implementation of the MDR-TB
health insurance packages is effective in –
a. Benefitting those who needs them most, especially
by equitable utilization of the packages by the
poorest 20% quintile population [32];
b. Improving the private sector involvement in
RNTCP.
By addressing these questions new insights will be
gained on implementation of RSBY and MSBY MDR-TB
benefit packages for both poor and non-poor MDR-TB
patients, paving efficient and feasible ways to support
progress towards India’s journey to UHC.
Methods
Setting
The state of Chhattisgarh in central India (population 28
million, having 27 districts) has 80% of the population
living in rural areas and 30% are considered “tribal”. Out
of 29 states in India, Chhattisgarh is the 10th largest and
17th most populated state in the country. Backward
class of population, namely Scheduled Tribes (ST) and
Scheduled Castes (SC), constitute 31.8% and 12% of the
state’s population respectively which belong to the most
disadvantaged socio-economic groups in India [33]. The
SC people are the one who were previously ‘untouch-
ables’ and ST are community of people who lived in tri-
bal areas (mainly forest) and are also known as ‘Adivasis’
[34]. Together the ST and SC population constitute 43%
of the total population in the state [35] and have been
traditionally marginalized. The state is also an insur-
gency hit (Left Wing Extremism or LWE) and poorest
state in India, with 47.9% of people is living BPL,
followed by 46.7% in Manipur and 45.9% in Odhisa. Of
all states in India, the states of Chhattisgarh, Manipur,
Odhisa, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Assam
figure among the poorest states where over 40% of
people are below poverty line [36]. 24 out of 27 districts
Table 1 Details of the innovative Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY) and Mukhyamantri Swasthya Bima Yojna (MSBY) MDR-TB
benefit packages
MDR-TB benefit
package name
Package details Package Rate Number of times/days claims can
be processed (Package Cap)
Pre-treatment
evaluations after
diagnosis of MDR-TB
Chest X-ray, relevant haematological and biochemical tests: complete
blood count (CBC), liver function tests (LFT), thyroid function tests
(TFT), blood urea nitrogen (BUN), creatinine, urine (routine & micro-
scopic), urinary pregnancy tests (UPT)
4000 (US$
67a)
Once
Follow-up evaluation Chest X-ray, relevant haematological and biochemical tests: CBC, LFT,
BUN, creatinine, urine (routine & microscopic)
3300 (US$
55)
Maximum five times for creatinine
and all other tests for maximum of
twice
Hospital stay Bed charges, doctors’ consultation fees and any other additional/
ancillary drugs
5600 (US$
93 @ US$ 13/
day)
Maximum 7 days’ stay on pro-rota
basis
MDR-TB multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
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in Chhattisgarh are backward districts [37] with only
three non-backward or economically rich districts. As
per the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO)
nationwide household consumer expenditure survey,
monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) is
estimated to be below 10 US$ ( 600) per month in
Chhattisgarh [38]. Besides, such socio-demographic
characteristics, the state has higher number of health fa-
cilities in public sector than in private sector [39], and
hardly any private health facilities in the tribal areas.
Most of the RSBY and MSBY empanelled private health
facilities are located in the urban areas [39].
How RSBY and MSBY health insurance schemes work?
Under the schemes each enrolled family is provided with
a bio-metric smart card for paperless, cashless and port-
able transactions through smart cards. Each family is
provided with a health insurance benefit of 500 US$ per
family per annum on a family floater basis (upto 5 mem-
bers in a family) and coverage of financial costs of the
hospitalization expense. Hospitalization can be for both
medical and surgical procedures (as per the predefined
RSBY and MSBY package list for medical and surgical
procedures). Conditions that are treated at home, con-
genital external diseases, drugs and alcohol induced ill-
ness, vaccination, war, nuclear invasion, suicide,
naturopathy, Ayurveda, Unani and Siddha are excluded
from the schemes (24). A key feature of RSBY health in-
surance scheme is portability - A beneficiary who has
been enrolled in a particular district can use the smart
card in any RSBY empanelled hospital across India. This
makes the scheme truly unique and beneficial to the
poor families who migrate from one place to the other
[13, 25]. Beneficiaries of the scheme get cash less treat-
ment in the government and private health institutions
empanelled under the RSBY and MSBY as per their
choice within the state and country. Additionally, trans-
port expenses of ~ 2 US$ per hospitalization is paid to
the beneficiary subject to a maximum of ~ 17 US$ per
year per family. The beneficiaries need to pay only 0.5
US$ as registration fee for a year while the Central and
State Government pays the fixed premium (12.5 US$) as
per their sharing ratio (between Centre and State, 75:25
for RSBY, 0:100 for MSBY) to the private insurer se-
lected by the state government on the basis of a com-
petitive bidding [Fig. 1].
In India, 93% of workforce is in informal sector [18]
where there is no formal employee and employer rela-
tionship arrangements, having both poor and non-poor
[Fig. 1]. RSBY scheme for social security for the poor re-
ceives complete subsidy from the central and state Gov-
ernment. However, in case of MSBY, 100% subsidy is
provided by the State Government of Chhattisgarh for
non-poor [Fig. 1]. In every state, the State Government
sets up a State Nodal Agency (SNA) that is responsible
for implementing, monitoring supervision and part-
financing of the scheme by coordinating with a private
insurance company, hospital, district authorities and
other local stake holders. Therefore the scheme has been
designed as a business model, an organization with
nexus of contracts or institutions, for the social sector
with incentives built-in for each stakeholder [Fig. 2]. De-
sign of this business model can be linked to the function
of the health financing systems [4], wherein Central and
State Governments collect revenue from the general tax
system, which is pooled at the state level by the RSBY
and MSBY state nodal agency to pay premiums to the
selected private insurance company. The private insur-
ance company reimburses the claims of the benefit pack-
ages from both private (accessed mainly by non-poor:
APL) and public health facilities (accessed mainly by
poor: BPL and unorganized workers) [Fig. 2]. So there is
transfer of pooled resources to public and private service
providers for giving fee for service [40] to the beneficiar-
ies by the purchasers - state nodal agency and the insur-
ance company, with weak regulation by the
Government. Strategic purchasing through output based
payments (a lump sum fee is reimbursed as per the
MDR-TB package rates) to the providers (public or pri-
vate health facilities empanelled under the schemes) by
the third party health insurance agency (TPA) is the pro-
vider payment method used in RSBY and MSBY Univer-
sal Health Insurance Scheme. This business model
design is seen as conducive both in terms of expansion
of the scheme as well as for its long run sustainability
[Fig. 2].
Data collection
Primary claims data on the uptake of ‘RSBY and MSBY
MDR-TB’ packages under the routine national health in-
surance programme setting were collected from the ser-
ver, accessible at the RSBY and MSBY State Nodal
Agency of Directorate of Health Services, Raipur, from
January 2013 to December 2015. This information was
shared electronically with the principal investigator by
the State Nodal Agency.
Data variables
The pre-defined data variables on patient code, package
name, hospital name, hospital type (Public or Private),
registration and discharge descriptions, scheme code
(RSBY or MSBY), patient characteristics – age, sex, APL,
BPL, unorganized worker, district and claim status, were
collected.
Data processing and analysis
In total, 1159 records were checked by going through to
identify any errors. 40 records for the Nuapada district
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were excluded as this district in not part of Chhattisgarh
state. Non-MDR-TB cases were also excluded from the
data analysis. A final clean dataset was imported to Epi-
Info version 7.1.5.2 software (CDC Atlanta, USA) for
analysis. We performed descriptive statistics analysis
using means, median and proportions. Where compari-
sons were needed, we used the Chi square test with α
set at 5%. Trends in the utilization of the packages from
2013 to 2015 in public and private sectors were derived
to bring out and compare differences in utilization. An
extension of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams for policy im-
plementation framework [41] was applied to understand
the implementation gap in the financial risk protection
policy for MDR-TB patients.
Results
Utilisation of claims in public vs private sector
A total of 1159 RSBY and MSBY MDR-TB package
claims were utilized by the beneficiaries [median age
43 years (IQR 30.5–55.5)], 67% claims from males,
between 2013 to 2015. A total of 1044 (90.1%) claims
were utilized by the beneficiaries in public health
facilities as compared to 115 (9.9%) claims utilization
in the private sector [Table 2]. 627 (54%), 278 (24%)
and 254 (22%) claims were respectively processed
under MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package,
MDR-TB hospital stay package and MDR-TB follow-
up evaluation package [Table 3]. Trends in utilization
of MDR-TB hospital stay and follow-up evaluation
packages showed better utilization of claims from the
public sector [Figs. 3 and 4]. No claims were utilized
under the MDR-TB follow up evaluation package
from the private sector [Fig. 4].
Utilisation of claims by poor vs non-poor beneficiaries
Pooled (RSBY and MSBY) data on claims utilization of
MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package showed that
in the public sector, poor beneficiaries utilized five times
more claims in 2015 than in 2013 mostly from the back-
ward districts [Fig. 5]. In the private sector, non-poor
beneficiaries utilized nineteen times more claims in the
year 2015 compared to 2013 [Fig. 6]. Claims were uti-
lized by non-poor fourteen times more in 2015 than in
2013 from non-backward or economically rich districts
Fig. 2 RSBY and MSBY, a business model, an organization as a nexus of contracts/ institutions (Developed from Kutzin J. Health financing for
universal coverage and health system performance: concepts and implications for policy, Bulletin of World Health Organization, 2013;91(8): 602–
11; and concept of organization as a nexus of contracts by Bruno Messen, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp. 2016)
Table 2 Key characteristics of the beneficiaries of all MDR-TB
Packages (2013–2015)
Key Characteristics RSBY MSBY Total
N = 911 (%) N = 248 (%) n = 1159 (%)
1. Age
< 15 46 (5.1) 14 (5.7) 60 (5.2)
15–34 239 (26.2) 80 (32.3) 319 (27.5)
35–54 373 (49.9) 91 (36.7) 464 (40.0)
55+ 253 (27.8) 63 (25.4) 316 (27.3)
2. Sex
Male 624 (68.5) 154 (62.1) 778 (67.1)
Female 287 (31.5) 94 (37.9) 381 (32.9)
3. Socio-economic status
Poor (1 + 2): 826 (90.7) 64 (25.8) 890 (76.8)
Non Poor (APL) 85 (9.3) 184 (74.2) 269 (23.2)
4. No. of claims utilized in public and private health facilities by the
beneficiaries
Public 822 (90.2) 222 (89.5) 1044 (90.1)
Private 89 (9.8) 26 (10.5) 115 (9.9)
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[Fig. 6]. In 2015, claims (313) surpassed the MDR-TB
cases notified (215).
Factors associated with the use of RSBY-MDR TB pre-
treatment evaluation package
In bivariate analysis, the odds of one-time use of RSBY
pre-treatment evaluation package in non-poor patients
was found to be 0.04 [95% CI (0.02–0.07, p < 0.0001)]
times less in comparison with the poor. This association
remained statistically significant in multivariate analysis
[Odds ratio: 0.03, 95%CI (0.01–0.05)]. Age, sex, district
type and the type of institution had no significant associ-
ation with the use of RSBY-MDR TB package. The re-
sults of bivariate and multivariate analysis are presented
in Table 4.
Discussion
RSBY and MSBY MDR-TB benefit packages were de-
signed for financial risk protection of MDR-TB patients
and to have equity in utilization of packages. These are
the main goals of the health financing systems [40]. In
the next section, extension of Kingdon’s Multiple
Streams (Problem, Policy and Politics streams) frame-
work [41] is used to discuss the utilization of RSBY and
MSBY MDR-TB benefit packages in terms of equity in
benefitting the poor from these packages.
Problem stream
MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package vs. follow-up
evaluation package
We found wide variations in claims utilization under the
three MDR-TB packages with highest utilization in
MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package - 627 (54%)
and lowest utilization in MDR-TB follow-up evaluation
package - 254 (22%). This finding indicates compromise
Table 3 Claim utilization status by poor and non-poor beneficiaries in public and private sector as per the MDR-TB package types
(2013–15)
Type of MDR-TB Package Claim Utilization
Poor – N (%) Non-Poor – N (%) Total, n = 1159 (%)
a) MDR-TB Pre-treatment evaluation package utilization in
Public 433 (87.6) 110 (82.7) 543
Private 61 (12.4) 23 (17.3) 84
Total 494 (100) 133 (100) 627 (54)
b) MDR-TB hospital stay package utilization in:
Public 185 (88.9) 62 (88.6) 247
Private 23 (11.1) 8 (11.4) 31
Total 208 (100) 70 (100) 278 (24)
c) MDR-TB follow-up evaluation utilization in:
Public 188 (100) 66 (100) 254
Private 0 0 0
Total 188 (100) 66 (100) 254 (22)
Fig. 3 Pooled (RSBY and MSBY) MDR-TB hospital stay package
utilization in the public and private sector from 2013 to 2015
Fig. 4 Pooled (RSBY and MSBY) MDR-TB follow-up package
utilization in the public and private sector from 2013 to 2015
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in continuity of care, wherein follow-up evaluation is of
paramount importance to monitor the progress of the
treatment until the patient is cured. Low utilisation of
follow-up evaluation package could also be attributed to
its low package cost, and hence, is less attractive for pro-
cessing claims under this package in both public and pri-
vate sector.
Public vs. private
A substantial difference in terms of the total number of
claims processed between the public and private sector
was noted with much greater involvement of public
health facilities in the financial risk protection mechan-
ism for MDR-TB patients. Public health facilities seemed
to outperform the private health facilities, which can be
attributed to a bigger number public health facilities
presence in rural and tribal areas, and hence their
empanelment by the state health insurance schemes.
This could be one of the possible reasons for low utilisa-
tion of claims by the beneficiaries in the private sector,
unlike in majority of the states in India where almost
half of the TB patients are accessing treatment in the
private sector [42]. Chhattisgarh is an exceptional state
where presence of public health infrastructure is higher
than the national average [43], as majority of tribal dis-
tricts in the state are insurgency hit [44] without much
presence of private health facilities. The private sector is
present mainly in urban cities and remains reluctant to
move to remote or rural areas as it can make more
profit by being in urban areas [39]. Establishing linkages
between MDR-TB packages and the universal health in-
surance scheme (RSBY and MSBY) was an attempt to in-
vent newer ways of public private partnership that
would engage and leverage the involvement of private
sector healthcare providers in MDR-TB care on a na-
tional scale in India. It was envisioned that implement-
ing this health insurance model for MDR-TB patients
could go a long way towards averting the majority of
OOP expenditure in the private sector, especially by
linking diagnosis and supply of drugs for MDR-TB with
the national TB control programme of Government of
India [13]. Effective public health programme linkage
with the public and private sector is of paramount im-
portance not only for financial risk protection of MDR-
TB patients, but also for comprehensive control of TB in
the community.
Poor vs non-poor
We found inequities in utilizing the packages under the
RSBY and MSBY schemes by the non-poor and poor,
which corroborate with evidence that voluntary health
insurance schemes create similar inequities [45]. The
non-poor MDR-TB patients were better able to access
the private sector than the poor for utilizing claims
under the MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package
with an increasing trend and with drainage of public
subsidy to the empanelled private health facilities. We
also found gender inequity in utilising the claims as 67%
of claims were utilised by the males. These disparities in
utilizing the claims, which are unequal and inequitable,
indicate lapse in proper implementation of MDR-TB
benefit packages.
Policy stream
Policy vs practice
Variations in utilization of the MDR-TB benefit packages
by public and private sector were also observed. Firstly,
not a single claim was processed under the MDR-TB
follow-up evaluation package from the private sector. A
MDR-TB patient requires minimum of eleven follow-up
evaluations during the course of MDR-TB treatment as
Fig. 5 Disaggregated pooled (RSBY and MSBY) data on claims
utilization of MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package by poor in
the public sector from 2013 to 2015
Fig. 6 Disaggregated pooled (RSBY and MSBY) data on claims
utilization of MDR-TB pre-treatment evaluation package by non-poor
in the private sector from 2013 to 2015
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per the national Programmatic Management of Drug Re-
sistant Tuberculosis (PMDT) guidelines [19]. Low
utilization of MDR-TB follow-up evaluation package
suggests that either the follow-up evaluations are not be-
ing done as per the schedule under the health insurance
mechanism or not properly carried out under the rou-
tine programme setting or any other cause, and this
needs to be investigated further. As per the policy of the
benefit packages, its utilization under RSBY and MSBY
schemes requires a hospital stay [24]. RSBY and MSBY
MDR-TB packages are applicable for MDR-TB patients
who are diagnosed as ‘MDR-TB’ cases by a RNTCP certi-
fied or any recognized laboratory on hospitalization
basis. Ambulatory care is yet to be included and imple-
mented in the mainstream health insurance [13]. How-
ever, utilization of MDR-TB hospital stay package was
found to be sub-optimal 278 (24%). These aforemen-
tioned variations in utilizing the packages reflect on the
weak implementation of MDR-TB benefit packages. The
implementation gap previously shown in the literature
lead to increased risk of incurring catastrophic expend-
iture due to TB [11]. Earlier studies on the mechanism
of health insurance linkage with the TB control
programme had recommended awareness campaigns,
training and capacity building of joint programme staff
for the success of this linkage [13]. Studies have sug-
gested that key strategy to improve utilization of the
RSBY scheme is by ensuring that the adequate informa-
tion on entitlements and benefits reaches marginalized
beneficiaries through proper awareness raising measures
[13, 27–30].
Politics stream
The political stream is present, but is loosely coupled
with the problem and policy streams. At the time of
agenda setting (Kingdon 1992), state level politics (Chief
Minister’s political will to promote UHIS) influenced the
formulation of the RSBY and MSBY MDR-TB financial
protection policy. Similar influence was lacking in the
implementation phase, as the implementation part of
the programme was typically left to the programme
officers.
Strengths and weaknesses of this study
There are important points that merit discussion on the
strengths and weaknesses of this study. This is the first
Table 4 Factors associated with the use of RSBY MDR-TB Pre-Treatment Evaluation Package by MDR-TB beneficiaries
Variable Bivariate analysis Multivariate analysis
Odds Ratio, OR (95% CI) p-value Odds Ratio, OR (95% CI) p-value
Age in years
0–14 Ref
15–34 0.88(0.36–2.19) 0.786 0.62 (0.20–1.98) 0.423
35–54 1.55 (0.62–3.83) 0.344 1.06 (0.33–3.40) 0.921
≥ 55 1.18 (0.47–2.98) 0.719 0.61 (0.18–2.01) 0.418
Sex
Male 0.95 (0.63–1.43) 0.815 0.97 (0.55–1.71) 0.910
Female Ref
Socio-Economic Status (SES)
Poor 0.04 (0.02–0.07) < 0.0001 0.03 (0.01–0.05) < 0.0001
Non-Poor Ref
District Sub-types
Most Backward & Left Wing Extremist Districts(MBLWE) 0.61 (0.26–1.41) 0.247 1.38 (0.63–3.01) 0.426
Backward & Left Wing Extremist (BLWE) 0.94 (0.48–1.85) 0.868 Ref
Backward Districts (BWARD) 0.85 (0.41–1.77) 0.66 1.36 (0.69–2.67) 0.372
Non Backward Districts (NBWARD) Ref 0.74 (0.18–3.03)
Hospital Types
Private 1.15 (0.63–2.10) 0.635 1.77 (0.59–6.12) 0.364
Public Ref
Year
2015 3.09 (1.79–5.34) < 0.0001 5.64 (2.57–12.39) < 0.00001
2014 2.07 (1.14–3.75) 0.016 1.76 (0.79–3.91) 0.169
2013 Ref
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study which looked in detail how RSBY and MSBY
MDR-TB benefit packages were used in the state of
Chhattisgarh, India, disaggregated by poor and non-
poor; in public and private sector; and across economic-
ally backward and rich districts, post its implementation
suggesting weakness in it. We used fully electronic
means of primary data collection and analysis. However,
this study had certain limitations. Firstly, since the ana-
lysis is based on review of quantitative data received
from State Nodal Agency (SNA), we do not know the
quality of service received and patient satisfaction in uti-
lising RSBY and MSBY MDR-TB packages. Secondly, we
didn’t have data on MDR-TB cases from private sector
and MDR-TB treatment outcomes from public and pri-
vate sector. Hence, we don’t know impact of the inter-
vention on adherence of MDR-TB treatment. To address
these shortcomings future mixed methods (using both
quantitative and qualitative) research for evaluating this
intervention and for assessing quality of services for
MDR-TB patients can be proposed [46]. Finally we only
had data for MDR-TB patients and not all patients en-
rolled in the RSBY and MSBY schemes. So we were un-
able to undertake multivariate analysis to fully explore
the differences in uptake of the packages between the
different groups and facilities controlling for the various
confounding factors. Examining this full dataset using
multivariate regression techniques would be a key area
for further research.
Conclusion and recommendation
An implementation gap was observed, reflecting weak
coordination between state nodal agencies and the state
TB department in the Chhatisgarh MDR-TB
programme. This creates an opportunity for a policy
entrepreneur to emerge, seize the window of opportun-
ity and advocate change. Variations and inequities in
utilization of MDR-TB packages; and low utilization of
follow-up evaluation package could be the consequences
of weak implementation of the MDR-TB benefit pack-
ages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Public health efforts
should be consolidated in strengthening the vast pres-
ence of public health facilities in the state through
proper institutional arrangements by establishing link-
ages with the national TB control programme for im-
proving service delivery to the MDR-TB patients in
order to achieve universal health coverage. Proper im-
plementation of MDR-TB benefit packages through the
health insurance mechanism could go a long way in con-
tributing towards achieving universal health coverage in
India, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 of the
United Nations that articulates to ensure healthy lives
and promote well-being for all, and progress towards
achieving the end-TB strategy target of zero catastrophic
costs due to TB by 2035. Complete engagement of the
national programmes from the stage of planning to exe-
cution, and periodic programme review is necessary to
ensure feasible and successful implementation of a pol-
icy intervention [47].
The following steps are recommended before scaling
up this innovative initiative for financial protection of
MDR-TB patients across the country based on literature
review - 1) Creating awareness [13, 27–30] to empower
the MDR-TB patients on their entitlements primarily at
the health facilities level which are empanelled in the
health insurance schemes. This can be achieved by ad-
equate counselling from the field staff to the patients for
reducing variations and inequities in utilisation of pack-
ages. 2) Joint programme review meetings [13, 27, 48]
for ensuring close monitoring of MDR-TB and health in-
surance programme (UHIS), identifying and addressing
critical bottlenecks, and to remove inequities by
strengthening the public sector and regulating the pri-
vate sector, are to be convened by the local stewards [27,
49] at state and district levels. 3) Training and capacity
building of both RNTCP and RSBY and MSBY State
Nodal Agency staff in the state [13] by the master
trainers of these programmes for correct identification,
enrolment, utilization and passing the benefits of the
packages to the beneficiaries.
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